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REPOI{TS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

TT-]E SUPHEME COUH1'
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

[8. F. No. ]7642.

In Bank.

May 25, 1948.J

WELLS FARGO RANK & UXTON TRUST CO., as Trustee,
etc., Petitioner, Y. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MARTN COUNTY, RespOlldent.
[1] Trusts-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate.
-Under Prob. Cude, § 1120, . probntp court's 5uri~didioll
over truots after a finnl decree of di;;tribution i~ limited to
trust:; crea tel1 by will.
P) Wills-Form-Incorporation of Other Writings by Reference.
-The doctrine of incorporation in a will by referenCl' cannot be :ll'plied without SOUle showing thnt the testator intended
to incorporate th(' nontestamentary document into hi~ will.
[3) Id.-Form-Incorporation of Other Writings by R,eference.It is not proper to apply tht' dortl'jllf' of ineorporatioll in a
will by referente to a vnlid and opnative inlel'-t'il'oS trust
when the trustor expres~('d an intention both in the "'ill :lnd
in t.he trust instrument thn t it bp not intorporn ted in the
will.
[4] Trnsts-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate.
-It. is the duty of the prohnte conrt, on proceedings for
distribution of a t('stalor';; estntp, to df>i ermine at the tillle of
the decree the exisil'lIl'e lind v:dillity of any trust created by
will and th" extent of any inter('st that (:ould pass to the
t.rustee under thnt will.

[3] May iw;trument illter-1Jil'OIl ol)(,l'nte also liS will, or part of
will, not(', 45 A.L.R. 8-:!:J. Bel', al"o, ~(i Cal.Jur. 849.
MeR. Dig. References: rl. 4. I), fl] Trnsts. ~ 11; [2] Will;;, ~ 183;
[3] Will", ~ ]81; [0] Deceuents' E,,!alc,;, ~ 1051:); [7] l'rusL:;, § 107;
[8J Trust~. § 104.
12 C.2d-J

(1)

-----------------11i\

.Juri~dicti()n

Over

TTllf;1.~:

C(lurt.f; flitting ill Probate.-if' ho),lill h all intert'st in
propt'J'ty ns tJ'lI~t('t' or :, trllst "l'l'lited hy will 01' as a tru~t"e
of an infer-vivos tl'lI~t, it is !I,l' dut.) of the prot:tle rourt. on
Ie!.

111 ')"if'l'lllinin:,:' \\'h.'I1,"<!' a

i"'r~oll

proceedings for di~trihntion of the testntol"s estllte, to interpret th(' will and tu determine whether the illter-vilw8 trust
agl'epment was part of 1he will; ani! a determination that thf>
trust was created by intl'r-vil1oS agreement precludf>s cunsideration of the question of the validity of' that trust IlR a
testamentary trust and the effect of Prob. Code, § 41, on the
property that had been transferred by the trustor before his
death.
[6] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Effect of Decree-Matters
Determined-Construction of Trusts.-A decree of distribution, designating a trust as an existing inter-vivos trust and
failing to specify tIle beneficiaries, purposes or disposition
of the assets distributed to it, is "conclusive as to the rights
of heirs, devisees and legatees" (Prob. Code, § 11)21) and, as
a devisee and legatee, the trustee is bound by the decree with
respect to the existence, validity of and rights under any
testamentary trust.
[7] Trusts-Construction and Operation.-It was evident from a
trust agreclIlent and a will that the trustor intended the trust
created by him to be a single trust administered as one unit
rather than as two trusts administered as two units, where the
trust agrecment provided thnt "upon my death the entire net
incomc from said trust as establishec by me in my lifetime,
or increased by me, under the provisions of my will, be paid
over annually," to designated persons, and where the will
evideneed the same intent by providing therein for an addition to the assets of the trust.
[8] ld.-Construction and Operation.-The question whether the
trustor has created one trust or Dlore than one trust depen:ls
primarily on the expressions of his intention in the trust
instruments.
[9] ld.-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate.The court sitting in probate properly d,>clined to hear and
determine a petition, after decree of distrihntion, to cunfirm a
trustee's sale where the trust, as determined in such decree, was
an infer-vivos trust, to whi('h assets w('rc adtled by the trustor's
will with the intent, clearly expressed both in the will sn.!
the trust agreemcnt, that the trust was to be ndministered
as a single unit. The trustee's remedy under such circumstances was to seek relif>f in a court of <>qnit.y having jurisdiction to settle the entire controversy.
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pj;OCEEDING in mandamus to compel a slqwrior (,Ol1rt
to ileal' al1d dC'tC'rmine a petition for confirmation of a trllstC'e's
sale of nil i1J1('rc~t ill real proprrty. Writ denied.

Helll'r, EIll'lnan, White & McAuliffe, Casper W. Weinherger and A J. Treat for Petitioner.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and Gordon Johnson
for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-Petitioner as trustee of a trust known as
the "Robbins Foundation" has petitioned this court for a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent court, sitting as a
probate court, to hear and determine a petition for an ordcr
confirming the sale of an interest in certain land that was
distributed to the trustee under the will of Frederick Averill
Robbins. The question before tbis court is whether the probate court has jurisdiction to hear the petition for confirmation of the sale of this interest in the land.
In 1916, Frederick Averill Robbins transferred certain
property in trust to the Union Trust Company of San Francisco, predecessor of the 'Yells Fargo Bank and Union Trust
Company. by a trust agreement under the terms of which the
trustee was to use the income from the property to establish
scholarships for certain students of the mechanical arts.
The trust instrument provides that" The property constituting said fund shall be invested and reinvested by my trustee
as in its discretion may seem to be for the best interests
thereof . . . and my trustee shall also have full power and
anthority, subject only to confirmation of court, to sell the
property composing said trust or fund. . .. "
The trustor reserved the power of modification, and he
made several modifications providing for the use of the income for certain charitable purposes, including the payment
of part of the income to the "Board of Governors, Shriners
Hospital for Crippled Children at San Francisco." Under
th(' terms of the trust as last amended on March 6, 1931, the
trnst was to be known as the" Robbins Foundation," and the
W ells Fargo BanI, was named trustee. The trustor also
directed in the 1931 amendment that "upon my death the
entire net income from said trust as established byme in my
lifetime, or increased by me, under the provisions of my
Will, b(' paid over annually to the Board of Governors,
Shril1ers Hospital for Crippled Children at San Francisco."
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On the samc day, the trustor also cxrcuteu a will in whicll
he limned the Wells Fargo Bank as executor and 11'ft crrtain
property to the bank as trustee for two othcr charitable
trusts, one for the benefit of the First Presbyterian Church
of Sausalito and the othcr for the benefit of the \Vomen'8
Club of Sausalito. In aduition the will provided for a bequest
to the Wells Fargo Bank as trustee of the "Robbins Foundation" of an amount sufficient to increase the corpus of that
trust to $200,000. After the death of the trustor, this will
was aumittE'd to probate and on January 26, 1934, an amended
uecrec of distribution was fileu uistributilll:,! ccrtaill real uncI
pcrsolla1 property, illcludiug the laud involved iu the present
proceeding, as follows;
"To the WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST 00., a corporation, as Trustee under a certain trust created by FREDERICK A. RORBINS during his lifetime and now designated a"
the ROnnINg FOUND.\T!ON . . . an undivided interest <:qnal
to 54.S2B/;' . . . .
"To the \VELLl:> FARGO BANK & UNION 'fRUST CO., a corporation, as 'frustee for the uses and purposes in paragraph
'l'lllHTEENTH of said Will . . . an undiviueu interest . . .
eqnal to 30.115% thereof, to have and to hold the same for
the blmefit of the Trustees of the First Presbyterian Chnrch
of Sau~alito, Marin County, California; to invest aud reinvest, or exchange . . . with full power and authority during
the continuance of the trust to sell or exchange any part or
portioll of the securities at any time composing said fund ....
"To the "WELLS FARGO B..\.1\"X & UNION TRUST Co., a corporation, as Trustee for the uses and purposes hereinafter
set forth . . . an undivided interest . . . equal to 15.057%
thereof, to have and to hold the same in trust for the uses and
purposes as follows:
"To invest and reinvest, or exchange, . . . with full power
and authority during the continuance of this trust to sell or
exchange any part or portion of the securities at any timc
composing said fund . . . and to dispose of and distribute
said trust fund and the proceeds thereof... to the
""OMEN'S CLUB OF SAUSALITO" for certain specified purposes.
On November 19, 1946, petitioner, "as trustee of the trusts
creatcd by the last will and testament of l<'rederick Averil!
Robbins" filed in respondent court a report of sale and a
petition for an order confirming the sale of the rea) property
ill question together with a petition for instructions to the
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frustp(' lind"" ~('(·till\l 1120 of (II(' 1'1'011.11,' I:od(', In l11P r('port of sa'" illid petition for l'Ol1n)'llialioll IIII'}''''!!' i1 \\';IS aIleg'PII tlial till' propprly had bpl'li "old L~' til(' pptit iOIl<'r, as
tru~:tp(' of till' three trusts, ":mbjeC'1 to tlH' {'onfirmation of
Court." TIJ(' trustee alll'/!rd ill tile petition for in"truetions
tlJ:lt Iii,' trllstl~e wus IIIH'I'rlain \l"lielll1'r tlndel' tht' tE-rlllo.; of
tll!' dr('j"{'{' uf di~lributioll with rl's)ll'l'1 to tIl/' tl·tI:<h for 1Ill'
LelleDt of till' \YollJell'~ Club <llld tllr' l'r('shytl'riall ('IIlIl'e11
the trllstl'l' had power to sell tIll' r('al property, Till' cuurt
Iwaru thl' I'etitiou for instructioJls awl uett'I'IJJi1J<.'d that pctitionel' as trlble(' of the \Volllcn's 01 ub I l'U~t and the Prt'shytE-rian Church trust had power to sell the interest of said
trusts in the real property pursuant to thc decree of distribution without confirmation of sale by the court. 'I'he cllurt,
):owe\,er, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for
an order eon firming the sale of the interest of the "Robbins
F'ollnllation," on the ground that the foundation is not a
trust created by will.
[1] Probate Code, section 1120 provides that "When
CI trust created by will continues after distribution, thE- supt·rior court shall not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final
distribution, but shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
dd\3rmining to whom the property shall pass and be delivered
upon final or partial termination of the trust, to the extent
that such determination is not concluded by the decree of
di:;;tributioIl, of settling the accounts and passing upon the
acts of the trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set
forth," (Italics added.) Although the probate c. urt has
broad powers under this section over the acts of the trustee
of a trust created by will (sec Estate of Smith, 4 Cal.App.2d
548, 552 [41 P.2d 565] ; Estate of Smead, 12 Cal.2d 20, 24
[82 P .2d 182]), its jurisdiction over trusts after distribution
is limited to trusts created by will. Except for the statute,
thl superior court, sitting as a probate court, would haw no
jurisdiction over trusts after the final decree of distribution
(Estate of McLellan, 8 Ca1.2d 49, 55-56 l63 P.2d 1120]), and
the Rtatute provides for such jurisdiction only when tlit'
trust has been created by will. The question arises therefore
wlwthcr the petitioner as trustee of the .. Hobbins FoundatioJi " held the interest distributed to it for the benefit of the
foundatioll as a trllster of a trust created by will or as a
trustee of Ull inter-t:it'lJ~ tru~t.

)

)

)

)

)

Jurisdiction of the probate ('Olll't ()"er the sale of this interest in the renl property canllot be sll~taine(l on either of
the two theories advanced: (1) that the whole of the "Robbins
Foundation" trust was illeorporateJ by reh'renee into the
will and thus after the trl1::;to1' 's <tvat h b{'came a trust created
by will; or (2) that the pruperty distributed to the trustee
of the "Robbins Foulldatioll" under the trustor's will constitutes the corpus of a testamentary trust separate from the
"Robbins Foundation" trust cl'eated by inter-vivos agreement.
[2] In regard to the first theory, the question is not
whether such an incorporation would be valid (S('e Estate of
Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 8 [60 P. 471] ; cases collected 4G A.L.R.
843; 21 Corncll L. Q. 492), for that question, if pertinent,
should have been determined during the probate proceeding.
Thc questioll is whether thc will or the decree of distribution
provided for such an incorporation. The doctrine of incorporation by reference canllot be applied without some
showing that the testator intended to illcorporah' the nontestamentary document into his will. (In re McCurdy's
Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 285 [240 P. 498] ; see, 1 Page on 'Vills,
§ 263; Atkinson on Wills, p. 336.) III carrying ont the general intention of the testator and the policy of the law against
intestacy (see Prob. Code. ~] 0:2) some courts interpret a
reference to nontestamentan' documents as indicative of an
intention to incorporate by reference certain otherwise inoperative nontestamentary instruments into the testator's
will. (An'ingtoll v. Brown, 235 Ala. 196 [178 So. 218, 220] ;
Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 425 [3 N.W.2d 752, 144
A.L.R. 704, 717], 41 Mich.L.Rev. 751, 752.) No problem
of invalidity or intestacy, however, is presented in the present
case, and there is no reason for applying the doctrine of incorporation by reference in the absence of some showing that
it would be in accord with the testator's intention. In many
cases the trustor of an express trust may deem it inexpedient
to incorporate the whole trust into his will. The trustor in
the present case, for example, may have been advised that
"The incorporation in a will of the terms of an independent
trust is {'ntirely gratuitous and lDay result in throwing the
corpus of the trust into the general estate disposed of by the
will, thereby unnecessarily subjecting the corpus of the trust
to administration under the will with attendant administration costs and o.i.torney's fees •••• " (Rappoport, Integrat-
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132 C.2d 1; 193 P.2d '21)

ing Jnsttnmrutf!of Disposition, 78 Trusts and Estates 571,
577.)
[3] It is neither necessary nor proppr to apply the doctrine of il1l'orporatioll h~' reference to a valid and opf'rative
inter-vit,us trust when the trustor, as in the pres(,lIt l'Hse, expres;..ed no intention ill the will or in the il1icr-lJiv()$ trust
instru111ent that tLe latt('r be incorporated illtu the will. The
expressed intention of the trustor in both uoculllellts was
contrary to the theory that he intended to incorporate the
trust into his will. He provided ill the 193] amendment to
the inter-vivos trust, on the same day that he exeeuted his last
will, for the disposition of the income from the "Robbins
}'oundation" trust, "as established by me in my lifetime or
increased by lllE: under the provision of ttty will." (Italics
ad<.led.) JIl his will he provided as follows:
"During my lifetime I have estahlished a certain trust
fund . . . now designated as 'ROBBl!'lS FOUNDATION.' Said
trust fund and the earnings thereof ure to be used by the
said WELLS FARGO BANK &. UNION TRUST CO. Ol~ SAN FRANCISCO, n corporation, the trustee herein named, for certain llses
and benefit.s ill the declaration of trust estnblishillg the same
designated. It is my PllrlJose and intent that tkr. curj'US of
said [lind be in amount Two HUNDRED THOUSAND ($2U/),000.00)
DOLLARS, and I hereby bfjqtteafk a sufficient amount of my
estate to make up the difJe"encf; between said SlllU of $200,000.00 and the value at the tim~ of my death of all securities
and properties which, in lily lifetime, I ll1ay hnvc ~ct-over
und placed in said fund." (Itnlics added.)
Any doubt that might remain as to the intention of the
trustor us expressed in his will, has been resolved by the probate conrt in its amended fiunl decree of distribution wherein
tllt' court ordered that. there be distributed to "the WELLS
FARGO BANK &, UNION TRus'r CO., a corpor~tion, ns Trustee
under n certain trust create,] by FREDERICK A. ROBBIN::; during
his lifetime /lnd now designated as the R.oBBINS FOUNDATION
the Sllm of $38,557.60 in cash and also an undivided int.erest
equal to 54.828% of the other assets of the estate hereafter
more particularly described and inventoried [including the
land in question]." (Italics added.) Moreover, the decree
di_~ not dcscribe the bcneficiary of the trust, the purpose of
the trust or the disposition of the foregoing assets nft.cr their
uis1riuntion to the trustee, but with respect to the trusts
clt'urly created by will, the dl'l'l"l'l' :;pecifies the bcm'ficiaries

)
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of tl](' trusts, the trust purposes, Ull<] the disposition of the
assets (listrilmt('u to the trush'(>.
[4] Petitioner contenus that there was 110 reason for the
probate court to det el'll1iue at the tilJleof tIll' (lL'crN' of distributioll whrtl)(>r or not the trust was inter-vivus or h'Rta·
meutary in character and that thereforr the decre\' should
not be cOllsidel'\'(l (]etermillative of this issue. It was the dlIty
of tIlt, probate l"ourt, however, to determine at the tillle of
the deeree of uistriblltioll tlJC existence anu validity of all~'
trust createu by will and the extent of any interest that
could pass to the trustee 1I1lder that will. . (Oook v. Ouok, 17
Ca1.2d 639, 652 [111 P.2<1 322] j Estate of Lorin[J, 2!J Ca1.2d
423,427 [175 P.2d 524] j Estate orEaster, 24 Cal.2d 191,194
[148 P.2d 601].) At the time of the decree the probate court
must distribute the estate "to the persons entitled thereto"
(Prob. Code, ~ 1020) and jJl the decree it "must llaUle the
persons and the proportions or parts to which each is entitled . . . . " (Prob. Code, § 1021.) [5] To determine the
persons entitled to distribution and the extent of their interests it was the duty of the probate court to interpret tIlE'
will and determine whether the into'-vivos trust agreement
was part of the will. If it had determined that the infervivos trust agreement was intended t.o be incorporated into
the will and that the wholr trnst was thus created by the will,
it would have been ne(~essary for the court to d(·termine the
validity of that trust as a testamentary trust and the effect,
if any, of section 41 of the Probate Code on the property
that had been transferred by the trustor before his death.
(Estote of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 431 [175 P.2d 524] j see
Rutherford v. Ott, 37 Cal.App. 47, 51 [173 P. 4901.) By
determining that the trust was created by inter-vivos agreement, it preduded consideration of that question to the extent
that the property had been transferred by the trustor under·
tIl(' inter-vivos agreement. The court was concerned primarily
with the questions of the identification of the distributl'f' and
the capacity of the distributc'e to take under the will. (S<'e
Swetland ". Swetland, 102 N.J.Eq. 294, 297 [140 A_ 279J j
In ,-e Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 331 [179 N.E. 755, 80
A.L.R. 981.)
[6] It is apparellt that the probate court did consider
the qnestion of th(· l1atll1'(' of the "Robbins Foundation"
trust and fOllnd that it was all inter-vivos trnst and that it
was unnecessary to cOllsider thl' validity and plirpos('s of the
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trust, for, as already has been observed, the decree designates
t he trust as an existing i Iller-vivos trust and fails to specify
the twncficinries, purposes. or disposition of th(' assets distributed to it, although those matters are spreified in detail
in the decree with respect to the two charitable trusts that
were created by will. This decree is, therefore, "conclusive
as to the rights of heirs, devisees and legatees" (Prob. Code,
§ 1021) and, as a devisee and legatee the trustee is clearly
bound by the decree with respect to the "existence, validity
of and rights under any testamentary trust, and the incidental
matters which necessarily are involved in a determination on
those subjects . . . . " (Cook v. Cook, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at
652; see also Estate of Loring, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 431; Estate
of Easter, supra, 24 Cal.2d at 194.)
The other theory on which the petitioner relies to show
jurisdiction in the probate court is that the property distributed to the trustee of the "Robbins Foundation" constitutes the corpus of a separate testamentary trust and, as
such, is a trust created by will within the purview of section
1120 of the Probate Code. Respondent '8 contention is that
the will and decree of distribution provide for Ii testamentary
transfer of certain property to an already existing inter-vivos
trust and that the whole of the .. Robbins Foundation" is
therefore one trust to be administered as a unit.
Ordinarily, when a trustor of an intt!r-vivos trust
provides in the trust instrnmf'nt for additions to the trust
by will and provides in his will for a gift to the trust, his
intention is to authorize the trustee "to deal with the whole
property as a unit. The only possible difficulty would arise
in states in which different conrts haw jurisdiction over testamentary trusts and trusts created inter-vivos. At common
law, howeyer, a court of equity had jurisdiction over all
trusts, and in many states today courts of probate are given
jurisdiction over both kinds of trust.:;."
(1 Scott on Trusts
p. 293.) In those states in which testamentary and inter-vivo!
trusts are subject to the jurisdiction of different courts, there
is no clear authority on the qnestion of whether one or both
have jurisdiction over this type of trust; however, "such
meagre anthority as exists points to equity, rather than pro·
bate, as the forum having jurisdiction over the combined
fund." (1 Nossaman. Trust Administration and Taxation,
pp. 603, 105, citing the unreported case of N ew York Trust

)

J

Co. v. Rausch, decided by t!le New York Supreme Court in
1938.)
[7] In the present case it is e,·ident from the trust agreement and the will that the t.r'lsh1r iutended the "Robbins
Foundation" to be a single trust administered as one unit
rather than as two trusts administered as two units. He pro,
video in the 1931 awelldluellt tu tlte inter-v'illOs trust agree·
ment that "upon my df-ath the ('1:1 :re net income frow said
trust as established by mc hi wy lifctir.le, or increased by
IDe, uuder tIle provislons of my Will, k paid over annually
to the Board of Governors, SLrim'rs Hospital for Crippled
ChiMren at Sun Ij'rnncisl~o." '!'Lc will evinces the same intent, fllr the trustor t!1er~ provided that "It is my purpose
au.! iIttent tJIat the corpus of said fnnd be in amount Two
HUNDRED TH,lUSAND ($2'JO,000.1)0) D(lLLARS, and I hereby
be'jlll'ath a suffil'ieut. nnlll:mt of JOy E'st.ate to make up the
difference. . . . " r.l'he decree' of distribution likewise indicates that at the time c:f the decree the probate court determille!l 1..'at the property ~houldbe distribnted to the
trustee of tbe fouudatioll to be administered as a single trust,
for the propE'rty in que~thn Wfl.S distributed to "the WELLS
:F'ARGO BANK & UNION r.l'RUS'l' CO., a corporation, as Trustee
under a certli:ll trust creat.ed by FREDERICK A. ROBBINS during
his lifl'timc."
[8] '1'be clnestioll wh~ther the trustor has created one
trust or J!lore thau line trnst depends primarily on the expressiOllS of his inteution in tbe t.rust instruments. (Huntington Not. Banlc v. Commissioners, 90 F.2d b76, 878; U. 8.
Pr'ust 00. v. Oommissioner, 2!JG U.S. 481, 487 [56 S.Ct. 329,
80 L.E,l. 340] ; Parkhurst v. Ginn, 228 Mass. 159, 166 [117
N.E. 2U21 ; Industrial ~l'rust Cu. v. Har1'ison, 67 R. I. 131, 146
[21 A.2tl 254, 135 A.L.R. 1312] ; cases collected 102 A.L.R.
257 involV!llg application of federal income tax; see also 40
Columb.L.Rev. 309, 310-311.) The question remains, however,
whether there is some established principle of law or reason
of policy that would justify tbis court inl'egarding the "Robbins Foundation" as consisting of two trusts, regardless of
the intention (If the trustor. Petitioner has not referred to
any principle of law tbat prevents a trustor of an inter-vivos
trust from increasing the corpus of the trust by, bequeathing
or devising pruperty for that purpose in his will. At least
two jurisUictions that have not accepted the doctrine of incorporation by refere~ce have sustained such gifts to existing
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)

)

)

inter-vivos trusts as a valid met.bod of iucreasing an established
trust. In SWCllflllU v. Swetland, 102 N.J .Eq. 294, 296-297
1140 A. 27!)], the New Jersey court. held that SUell a !rift
was yaliu "regardless of what the rule is in New J ersl'Y with
respect to the uoctrine of incorporation by reference . . . .
By it tlw testator merely added additional property to 1\
trust fuuu cstauli:;Led by him years before the execution of
his will uuder u valiu, active trust. . . . 'l'he trust to which
this bequest is auded is not theoret.ieal, nebulous, intangible
or incapable of ideutification, but exists in fact, and thl'
trustcl'-ll'gate" is as distinct and definite an entity as would
hnve be.~n an individual or corporation legatee." The New
York Court of Appeals in In n Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327,
330-331 [17!) N.E. 755, 80 A.L.R. 98], involving a similar
additioll to the corpus of an inter-vivos trust by will, held that
"at tlk execution of this will there was in existence a valid
~t"t"(~ (,f trllst whereby n trustee was under a duty to appl~·
tb" subject-matter of the grant to uses there declared. All
thal the later will does is to I!ive addit.ional property to the
same trustee to be belu in the sallJe way . . . . A gift to a
trust company as trustee of a trust ereated by a particular
(ked iuentifies the trnst in describing the trustee, like a gift
it. a corporation for tbt: nses sta.ted in its charter . . . . The
l('gaey whell givp.n was not thl' declaration of a trust, but
the enlargement of the subject-matter of a trust declared
nlr('a,ly." 'l'his rule, applicable where the doctrine of in,·ol"porat.ion by reference is not accepted, applies for the same
r('a~OllS to a gift to an existing trust that the trustor did not
int('nd to incorporatp into his will.
~o reason of policy has been suggested why this court should
I"l'gl11"(l the foundation a~ two separate trusts c'lntrary to the
,·xpressel} intentiou of the trustor. [9] Petitione:- contends
t hat since thc two other charitable trusts referred to in the
will are clearly testamentary trusts "the probate court alone
has jurisdictiOl~ over the8e two latter trusts" and an "anomalOllS situation would arise if the Robbins Foundation trust
is held to he inter-vivos aud out!'licle the jurisdiction of the
probate court, for then 55~( of the Robbins house will be
ullLit'r tlw jurisdiction of the Superior Caurt in the exercise of
its ~l'nd'al eqnitaiJk jurisdiction while 45% of the same bouse
·,,·ill bl' llndC'r til!' jurisdietion of the pr!)bate court." The
!:ollh'ntioll t.llat the probate court alolle has jurisdietion of tlH'
h'>;t aJlIl!l1tary trmits wouhl c{·rtainly not support a decision
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holding the fouJI(lation to be two scpal'ate trusts, one inter1:iv{Js :md tllC other telitamclltary, for if tbi;, contl'l1tion is
sound, all anomalous situatioll would arise with rCSpt!ct to
the future adu~inistratioll of thc foundation, with part of its
asset!'. subject to the jurisdietion of OlIC court alld part subject to another. If the trustec should fail to kecp th!' assets
separate it would apparently be nl'Ct'SSll ry for thc 1rustee to
seek tlw approval of two courts every time it sought to exercise its power of sale with respect t,., those assets. Thl~ trustor
clearly did not intend such result in creating the Robbins
Foundation or in providing in his will for an addition to its
asset.."I.
In nny cvtmt, petitioner's contention is without nwrit, for
the probate court was not the only court that could have
jurisdictioll to approve or di"lapprove thl' entire transaction.
Sincl' the jurisdiction over trusts confl!rrl;d on a court sitting
as a "onrt l)f probate iN limited to tl.'stamp.ntary trnsts. and
th .. juril,Jidioll of a court haying ~eneral ':qllity p. "'Vers is
mucr. broader, petitioner's remedy under the circumstances
was to seek relief in a court of equity having jurisdiction to
settle the entire controversy. In the absence of Probate Code,
section 1120 all trusts, after distributi< n, would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the superior court, not sitting as a court
of probate (Estate of 111 cLellan, supra, 8 Ca1.2d 49, 55-56)
and that court, at least, retains residual jurisdiction over
trusts not within the jurisdiction of a probate court. Whether
or not in a situation involving testamentary'trusts alone, the
jurisdiction ,. conferred on the court siWng in probate by
section 1120, Probate Code, supra, is exclusive or is concurrent
with the exercise of jurisdiction sitting in equity" (Willson v.
Security First-Nat. Bank, 21 Ca1.2d 705, 712 [134 P .2d 800],
collecting cases; see also, Dowdall v. Superior Court, 183 Cal.
348,353 [191 P. 685].), where the probate court lacks jurisdiction to determine an issue involving both testamentary
and nontestamentary trusts, it is proper "for the snperior
court not sitting in probate to take jurisdiction of it and
fully determine the controversy." (McCaughna v. Bilhorn,
10 Cal.App.2d 674, 684 [52 P.2d 10251; see also Howard v.
Bennett. 53 Cal.App.2d 546, 548 [127 P.2d 1012].)
The petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus is denied
and the alternative writ is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J .. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer.

J,/ aud Spence, J., cOllcurred.

